¿Negociación salarial secuencial o simultánea?

  • Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz
  • María Luz Campo

Abstract

This paper analyzes the timing of wage bargaining in an unionized market when
workers can be organized in firm level unions or in an industry-level union. In
equilibrium, the result obtained depends on who decide the timing of the
negotiations: the workers or the firm’s owners.
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How to Cite
Barcena-Ruiz, J., & Campo, M. (2016). ¿Negociación salarial secuencial o simultánea?. Estudios de Economía, 28(2), pp. 183-202. Retrieved from http://www.estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40813/43557
Section
Articles
Published
2016-05-05